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This paper analyzes the accepted definitions for the scientific subject of museology conceived by ICOFOM theorists 
who first questioned the ‘museum’ as an accepted paradigm. It intends to point out some of the inconsistencies in the 
philosophical stranskyan museology in order to reformulate the notion of its subject of study. This debate will require a 
revision in such a philosophical perspective through the sociological viewpoint in the light of the actor-network theory 
proposed by Bruno Latour. Finally, the paper sustains that the man-reality relation forged in the West as a hegemonic 
museum performance should not define museology’s subject of study. On the contrary, it should consider all kinds of 
possible associations between the different roles that are performed, evolving from a corpus of reflections on the muse-
um to a reflexive museological discipline.
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reSumen
En este artículo se analizan las definiciones aceptadas para el campo científico de la museología concebidas por los 
teóricos del ICOFOM que primero cuestionaron al “museo” como paradigma. Pretende señalar algunas de las incon-
sistencias en la museología filosófica strankiana con el fin de reformular el concepto de su objeto de estudio. Este debate 
requerirá una revisión de dicha perspectiva filosófica a través del punto de vista sociológico, a la luz de la teoría del 
actor-difusor de la red propuesta por Bruno Latour. Finalmente, el artículo sostiene que la relación hombre-realidad 
forjada en Occidente como una actuación del museo hegemónico no debería definir el objeto de estudio de la mu-
seología. Por el contrario, debería tener en cuenta todo tipo de posibles asociaciones entre las diferentes funciones que 
se realizan, evolucionando desde un corpus de reflexiones sobre el museo hacia una disciplina museológica reflexiva.
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This debate will require a revision in such a phil-
osophical perspective through the sociological 
viewpoint, which will lead us to conceive what 
could be a proper path to a scientific discipline, or, 
in other words, to a reflexive museology.
1.1 Redirecting museology: the configuration 
of a science of associations 
From the 1980s several attempts were made and 
theoretical essays were written aiming to formu-
late a single foundation for the study of museums 
and museology. The contrast between a diverse 
practice organized according to institutional needs 
and a possible science with strong foundations is 
directly addressed in the first issue of the Museo-
logical Working Papers, published by ICOFOM, 
in 1980. The first conclusion presented in this is-
sue, by Villy Toft Jensen considering the opinions 
of several museum professionals from Eastern 
Europe in the 1970s, was that “a simple common 
museology does not exist” (Jensen 1981: 9).2 
Indeed, since 1965, in the former Czechoslo-
vakia, Stránský raised questions on the subject of 
study of museology, denying, for the first time, the 
museum as its scientific subject matter (Stránský 
1965: 30-33). The museum would be, accord-
ing to Stránský, “only an instrument to perceive 
a certain way of cognition of society” (Stránský 
2005: 111 apud Baraçal 2008: 70). He would be 
responsible for the dislocation of the museology 
subject from the museum, as a historic institution, 
to museality – understood as a “specific aspect 
of reality”. This notion3 would lead Stránský to 
conceive museology’s intention as the scientific 
interpretation of an “attitude of man to reality” 
(Stránský 1980 apud Van Mensch 1992). 
This reflection was possibly the mark zero for 
the development of a systematic thinking on mu-
seology and its scientific subject in Central and 
Eastern Europe. From the late 1970s, ICOFOM4 
would be conceived by Jan Jelínek and Vinoš 
Sofka and the embryo of a theory for museology 
would be implanted thanks to the new possibili-
ties for international dialogues within this com-
mittee. 
In the 1980s, with the first publication that in-
tended to openly discuss museology in a demo-
cratic way in the newborn field, Sofka and Jelínek 
were the first to pose the question: “Museology, 
science or just practical museum work?” (MU-
WOP 1980). And with the attempt to answer the 
question it was inaugurated possibly the first mu-
seological discussion in ICOFOM. Among the 
1. Museology’s subject of study: from the 
foundations to its reassembling 
What is the ‘museum’, the supposed subject of 
study of museology? A field of studies was born 
with this very question. In the past 35 years since 
the creation of the international committee for 
museology (ICOFOM) and the emergence of the 
first works discussing “museology” instead of the 
mere practices related to museums, the quest for a 
scientific definition has begun – which remained 
unsuccessful so far.
In fact, until present time, museology has been 
taught and practiced as a specific disciplinary 
field intending to become a scientific field. Never-
theless, it has been operating as a particular way 
of conceiving experiences and relations under the 
light of a more or less traditional idea of the mu-
seum1.
It is legitimate to ask why, even after the efforts 
of ICOFOM and the amount of theoretical stud-
ies and interdisciplinary researches published, we 
are still not able to define museology as a human 
or social science. As pointed out by Zbyněk Z. 
Stránský (1980: 44), being a science would imply, 
firstly, having a defined subject of study recog-
nized by certain peers. Other than that, a science 
must use specific methods of its own, as well as 
a specific terminology. These last two points are 
viscerally connected to the definition of the first.
If museology is not considered an effective 
science by most of the thinkers and researchers 
related to this field (who generally resort to the 
use of interdisciplinary methods and a confused 
terminology to study diffused objects), this is due 
to the very inability to define its subject of study. 
In the 1970s and 1980s, a specific field of ideas 
partially related to the social sciences was being 
developed devoted to museums which was world-
ly known as the movement of New Museology. 
The main political actors and intellectuals related 
to it were confronted with a fundamental paradox: 
on the one hand, the desire of most thinkers to 
conceive a unity for the scientific subject of mu-
seology, on the other the empirical diversity ob-
served in the different manifestations of the mu-
seum. How to solve such an epistemic standoff?
The present paper analyzes the most accepted 
definitions for the scientific subject of museolo-
gy conceived by the icofomian theorists who first 
posed the question here enunciated. We intend to 
point out some of the inconsistencies in the phil-
osophical stranskyan museology (Baraçal 2008) 
to reformulate the notion of its subject of study. 
51
Bruno Brulon Soares The Museum Performance: Reflecting on a Reflexive Museology
Complutum, 2015, Vol. 26 (2): 49-57
world as a mind and the objective reality is giv-
en. Therefore, as an institution that simply ap-
plies specific relations of man to reality, muse-
ums are socially and philosophically outdated.
Equally influenced by Stránský’s way of think-
ing, Waldisa Rússio defines, in 1981, the subject 
of museology as the museum fact, or the museo-
logical fact, understood as “the profound relation-
ship between man, the cognizant subject, and the 
object” (Rússio 1981: 42). This Brazilian theorist 
separates, once again, the subject of reason – un-
der the clear influence of the cogito – from the 
object of knowledge, “that part of reality to which 
man belongs, and over which he has the power to 
act”, both parts considered in the museum fact.
The very definition of the subject of study of 
museology as a relation between parts that differ-
entiate themselves creating an asymmetry is an 
error in the sense that it ignores how asymmetries 
and differences are socially created. There is no 
such thing as a ‘relation’ if we conceive the so-
cial world as a network of associations that gen-
erate constant transformation. The contemporary 
anthropologist Bruno Latour states that it is pre-
cisely because it is so difficult to maintain asym-
metries, to durably entrench power relations, 
or to enforce inequalities, that so much work is 
being devoted in shifting the weak and fast-de-
caying ties to other types of links (Latour 2005: 
66). ‘Relations’ are a deceiving kind of link that 
reifies the social reality. In addition, the ‘social’ in 
itself is here perceived as “a type of connections 
between things that are not themselves social” 
(Latour 2005: 5-7), or as a movement of re-asso-
ciation and reassembling, according to Latour’s 
actor-network theory (ANT).
What we propose in the present text is the dis-
location of the epistemological problem of muse-
ology from the subject of study to the cognitive 
frames we use to interpret it. In other words, the 
museological ‘problem’ is not having the museum 
as subject matter, but understanding the museum 
exclusively by a dated philosophical assumption 
(the Cartesian cogito) limiting all thinking pro-
cess. As we will sustain, the subject of museol-
ogy should not be defined unidimensionally by 
the subject-object relation forged in the West. 
Otherwise, it should consider all kinds of possible 
associations between subjects, objects, relations, 
subjects behaving as objects, objects behaving as 
subjects, etc. Because these roles are performed 
by people and things in reality and are reified 
in the museum theory produced over the last 50 
years. They are simply parts played by the most 
selected authors, several followers of Stránský’s 
germinal thinking would take the first steps in di-
rection to the definition of museology’s scientific 
subject. Among them, we will contemplate the 
celebrated views of Anna Gregorová and Waldisa 
Rússio.
Anna Gregorová, Czech author influenced 
by the gnosiological references introduced by 
Stránský5, defined the museological subject of 
study as “specific relations of man to reality” 
(Gregorová 1980: 19). With this vague defini-
tion, that would be quoted by many other the-
orists in the following years, Gregorová would 
emphasize different aspects of the museum rela-
tion, like, for instance, “structurality” and “dif-
ferentiatedness”. This last one consisting in the 
fact that the subject in the relation realizes the 
totality of reality and at the same time differen-
tiates itself from the object of observation, as-
suming a museum attitude towards the observed 
reality.
The problem with the definitions presented 
in the first theoretical approaches to museol-
ogy is in the cognitive notion of the “relations 
of man to reality” conceived by Gregorová and 
Stránský. This philosophical assertion reifies the 
separation of man from reality and presuppos-
es the existence of a (material) reality that is 
divorced from society. Two sociological errors 
that should be adamantly avoided in a museol-
ogy that should be concerned with a wide range 
of associations between the different agents of 
society.
First, we may recall that the breach between 
subject and object is, in fact, fabricated by a par-
ticular appropriation of reality. It was first con-
ceived as an important part of Descartes’ cogito, 
according to which subjects as “minds” exist 
as completely separated entities from physical 
reality. This conception of a mind that is even 
detached from a physical body and that exists 
beyond any materiality lies in the foundation of 
idealistic philosophy. It was further explored by 
Kant, and discussed by Hegel. But it’s only since 
the Enlightenment that Rationalism would trans-
late into politics, becoming a central part of the 
dominant ideologies in the West. In the case of 
museums, this breach is a historic phenomenon 
that distinguishes Modernity and characterizes a 
certain a priori for the existence of these insti-
tutions.
According to the gregorovian assumption, 
museums are places where this separation be-
tween a subject that thinks and conceives the 
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simple mirrors, but rather “magical mirrors of so-
cial reality”, because they are capable of exagger-
ating, inverting, re-formatting, magnifying, mini-
mizing and even falsifying the known chronicled 
events (Turner 1988: 42). By performing culture 
through drama to a society, museums also enact 
the very drama of the ‘museum’, its meaning, its 
authority, its power.
What we aim here with the dislocation of the 
museological subject of study from the strict 
man-reality relation to a broader, sociologically 
founded, unit of analysis, is to demonstrate that a 
relation between philosophical entities –man-re-
ality, subject-object– constitutes, in fact, a type 
of performance. This way we distance ourselves 
from a science of relations to reach a science of 
associations that studies actors in their agencies 
instead of a Cartesian equation. 
In that sense, “man” cannot be considered the 
only actor in a ‘relation’. For the ANT, defended 
by Latour, if we stick to the decision to consider 
the actors through their agencies, then anything 
that does modify a state of affairs by making a dif-
ference is supposed to be an actor (Latour 2005: 
71). Thus, there is no hierarchy established to dif-
ferentiate subjects from objects. A thing is also 
studied as an actor in the subject-object equation 
– or, at least, an actant, if it has no figuration yet. 
This, of course, does not mean that these partici-
pants ‘determine’ the action, that “hammers `im-
pose’ the hitting of the nail”. According to Latour: 
 “In addition to `determining’ and serv-
ing as a ‘backdrop for human action’, things 
might authorize, allow, afford, encourage, 
permit, suggest, influence, block, render 
possible, forbid, and so on” (Latour 2005: 
71).
This also does not mean that objects do things 
‘instead’ of human actors. Latour argues that no 
science of the social can exist if the question of 
who and what participates in the action is not 
firstly explored. This primary scientific question 
could mean – and it certainly does for museolo-
gy – letting in the so-called “non-humans” (La-
tour 2005: 71). The human-reality relation, then 
– limiting museology’s subject – could begin to 
be perceived as a relation between associations, 
and, in that sense, it could be fully studied by a 
human science. 
In a more realistic sociological perspective we 
have to accept that the continuity of any course 
of action or relation will rarely consist of hu-
different types of elements, and they can be mod-
ified, inverted, transformed or translated in differ-
ent ways, conforming what we call the museum 
performance. 
1.2 The museum performance
Presenting the problem of museum and reality – 
reality as the museum object – Gregorová reaches 
an ontological problem that is in the core of mu-
seology, i.e. the explanation of reality in itself, as 
a carrier of a gnoseological value and potential 
(Gregorová 1980: 19), or of a museum value, also 
known as museality. By dislocating the question 
from the museum relation to the reality that ‘is 
produced’ by it, Gregorová points out the fact 
that there is something between man and reali-
ty, something beyond the object and matter that 
is worth being studied. This thing that is philo-
sophically presented as a property of the muse-
um object is created by the museum performance 
(Brulon Soares 2011).
The performance angle has been, until now, 
almost underexplored in museology, considering 
its potential to reveal how museums operate and 
produce cultural meanings. As an intrinsic part 
of “social dramas”6, cultural performance is al-
ways connected to ‘real’ events, but performanc-
es are not simple expressions of culture or even 
of changing culture. Considering some cultural 
forms as not so much reflective as reflexive, Victor 
Turner points out that here the analogy is not with 
a mirror but rather with a reflexive verb. In that 
sense, culture, like verbs, has, in most languages, 
at least two “moods”, indicative and subjunctive, 
and these are most hopelessly intermingled. As 
Turner explained it, when society bends back on 
itself, it 
…“meanders, inverts, perhaps lies to it-
self, and puts everything so to speak into the 
subjunctive mood as well as the reflexive 
voice” (Turner 1988: 24-25). 
By doing that, society works in a state of sup-
position, desire and possibility, rather than stating 
actual facts. This arrangement of things dissolves 
what were once factual components of reality and 
instates a more playful spirit. A ‘reflex’, on the 
other hand, presupposes ‘realism’. But of course, 
even in the context of a museum, or in art and 
literature, realism is only a matter of artifice and 
what is real is a result of cultural definition. For 
Turner, the genres of cultural performance are not 
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misunderstanding of what is meant. Only 
then will we be able to have progressive dis-
cussion” (Hodge 1983: 61). 
In the very moment when social sciences are 
questioning their fundamental principles and 
are confronted with the ‘truth’ that there are no 
‘truths’ in sciences, museology thinkers inside 
ICOFOM seemed to claim for a single truth capa-
ble of providing an immediate systematic theory.
According to Joanna Overing (1985: 2-5), ex-
ploring a recent crisis of faith in philosophy over 
the empiricist’s paradigm of rationality, with-
in science the idea of a “single world” is being 
challenged. Turning the look to themselves and 
their own actions, social scientists reveal that the 
world, from the perspective of our knowledge of 
it, is how we view it through the paradigms we 
create. These scientists, differently from philoso-
phers who are usually not asking social questions, 
are asking about “moral universes” – in Overing’s 
terms – their basic duty being to understand the 
intentions and objectives of actors within particu-
lar social worlds. Contrary to the modern Western 
science and the empiricist’s proposition that truth 
is amoral and facts are autonomous from value, 
facts and truths can be analyzed as being tied to 
different sets of social, moral and political val-
ues. Thus, all truths have their moral aspect and 
to hope to find universal and independent criteria 
of truth has proven to be an unreachable goal that 
suits only to philosophers who are still defending 
their control over reality construction.
The task of social sciences is to understand the 
knowledge actors have of their own moral uni-
verse, considering their standards of validation 
with respect to it (Overing 1985: 5). The cogni-
tive powers of the Western thought in controlling 
and knowing the material world are in the base of 
museums, but they cannot be the foundation of 
contemporary museology. What is being gradu-
ally perceived with the possibility of a science of 
the science is the fact that Rationality works as a 
limiting tool for the scientist viewpoint over the 
Others and specially over him/herself. The West-
ern fetishism for epistemological objects such as 
‘reason’, ‘truth’ and ‘knowledge’ -or, even, the 
‘museum’- is little by little demolishing the ways 
we relate to moralities and epistemologies differ-
ent from ours.
Throughout most part of the 20th century, in the 
first years of the development of museology in 
the world, the thinkers of the ‘museum’ were not 
separated from their supposed subject of study. 
man-to-human connections or of object-object 
connections, but will probably zigzag from one to 
the other (Latour 2005: 75). The simplistic trian-
gulation between man, object and institution, that 
traveled through all museology theory so far, is 
sociologically barren. The museum performance, 
in which the three roles of the ‘public’, the ‘object’ 
and the ‘museum’ are socially enacted, should no 
longer be perceived as a true social relation, in or-
der to be systematically studied as a performance 
of the social – or of the museal. 
This new perception implies that if the museum 
is a thing that performs the man-reality relation, 
musealization, then, is the action towards which 
we should direct our interest – as social scientists 
or scientists of associations. Because associations 
prevail, we can conceive, for instance, calculation 
without a calculator, acceleration without a car, 
or even education without a school. Musealiza-
tion, then, exists beyond the museum. As well as 
the hammer does not ‘impose’ the hitting of the 
nail, museums do not impose musealization. In 
fact, museums are the mediators and not the main 
actors of musealization; they participate on the 
action, but they cannot configure, in any conceiv-
able way, the sole subject of museology. 
As some freedom of movement is granted back 
to non-humans, the range of agents able to partic-
ipate in the course of action extends prodigious-
ly and we are, finally, no longer restricted to the 
limited philosophical equation we are so used to 
in museology. 
Thus, the study of museum performances in-
tends to reach the realization of the fact that ob-
jects as well as subjects are made. Objects. Sub-
jects. Reality. Social categories constructed in the 
museum performance, instead of absolute truths 
constitutive of this institution. Masks that mu-
seums enact in a specific moment of our history. 
Museology, as a social science, cannot be limited 
to them in order to define its field of study. 
2. Reflection and reflexivity in Museology 
In 1983, in the first ICOFOM symposium, in Lon-
don, John Hodge exclaimed: 
…“What we need is someone to outline 
a theory in finite terms which we all under-
stand. Its philosophy, its statement of propo-
sitions used as principles of explanation for 
phenomena etc. needs to be clearly stated 
with concrete examples so that there is no 
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Museology has for long been submitted to an 
epistemology of the information sciences, along 
with archivology and librarianship. But the ‘re-
lation’, for this sciences, is a mere informational 
one - leaving human experiences and performanc-
es outside of their scope. For instance, libraries 
and archives treat information as the main object 
of the visitor’s discovery, while museums, on the 
other hand, have the visitor as an object in itself. 
Information centers are supposed to be transpar-
ent; museums are allowed to ‘play’ hide and seek 
with its objects, using lights, shadows, sounds and 
theater to engage their visitors in a meaningful 
performance. Of course museums deal with infor-
mation too, but in a way that it is impossible for 
them to be defined by disciplines that study muse-
ums solemnly by the informational approach. In 
other words, the subject of museology cannot be 
that objective if we intend it to be human. 
Instead of developing a comparison with these 
other institutions in order to establish the place 
of museology among other sciences it would be 
more profitable for the present analysis to consid-
er the point of view of the sociality of museums. 
By using the term “sociality” Marilyn Strathern 
(1996: 66) evokes the idea of a “society” as a 
method of investigation that raises more ques-
tions about the observers than it presents answers 
about the ones who are observed. A “society”, in 
that sense, is not an object in itself, it does not im-
plies some kind of organization, instead, it orga-
nizes the objects produced by the social scientists 
themselves. If museology thinkers stopped look-
ing for stability – in museums and societies – to 
start observing all kinds of performances that can 
be museological, and the tracing of their associ-
ations (Latour 2005: 5), then we may be able to 
conceive museology as a social science after all. 
In the study of performances, the stability of 
the museum (as a social category museologists 
are so attached to) vanishes in thin air. When 
taking into account the actors and its agencies a 
scientist must consider that the object of a perfor-
mative definition disappears when it is no longer 
performed, or, if it stays, then it means that oth-
er actors have taken over the relay (Latour 2005: 
37). That is how fugitive the object of a science is. 
Today we can say that the breach between sub-
ject and object is a relative one, and the new sci-
ences should avoid defining their subjects based 
on a Cartesian reified assertion. This leaves mu-
seology – as well as other sciences – with a brand 
new path to follow (or to invent, if it is the case) 
in order to achieve any kind of scientific status. 
Museum professionals were the ones conceiving 
‘museology’. The separation between scientists 
and their subject of study –that is usually con-
structed by scientific methods– has not been fully 
accomplished in museology. Perhaps the reason 
we are still unable to define the subject of museol-
ogy is that we are so close to museums we remain 
their faithful hostages.
What differentiates, though, ‘museology’ from 
‘museum theory’ or ‘museum studies’ is the de-
sire of the first to be acknowledged as a science in 
the contexts in which this term is being used. In 
order for that to happen, a distance must be cre-
ated between scientists and their subject of study. 
The theory of museology produced in the past 40 
years is neither a product of museum practice nor 
the mere expression of a few philosophers’ ideas 
disseminated from Eastern Europe. In fact, the 
theory is the result of a reflection developed by 
these thinkers confronted with certain museum 
practices in the different contexts they act.
Methodologically speaking, the agents that 
make museums and their agencies must be stud-
ied by the scientists and researchers of museol-
ogy today. Nevertheless, when the same people 
are playing both roles - the scientist that is also 
the museum professional -the scientific distance 
will depend on an exercise of reflexivity on his/
hers own museal practice. Here the museal will be 
clearly separated from the museological with the 
artifice of performance.
The first works on museology, by icofomian 
theorists, were just theory and not science because 
they consisted in mere reflections lacking the re-
flexivity that is in part the acknowledgement of 
performance in the constructed truths. The study 
of the museum performance today allows any sci-
entist to see him/herself as an actor in the stage of 
the museum representations. Such a reflexivity in 
the making of science may reveal to be a process 
that includes self-knowledge and the revision of 
paradigms.
2.1 Museology: a science among others?
As we can acknowledge, the paths chosen by mu-
seologists – here understood as the theorists of 
museology as well as museum professionals (and 
most of the times, as both) – have not been able 
to determine a real paradigm for the supposed hu-
man science they defended. What we argue in the 
present paper is the fact that, maybe, most of the 
explored roads to the subject of museology hav-
en’t been human enough. 
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dogmas. For sciences that strongly desire to con-
trol its own part of reality – as the human sciences 
in general – the notion according to which human 
beings invent their own reality is debated with 
great difficulty. The apparent solution to supplant 
it is, in most of the cases, the centrality of em-
pirical work aiming to deconstruct the established 
truths and the discussion of the methods in this 
process. 
The discussion of a specific method for mu-
seology will raise two fundamental questions: 
first “how museology molds the practice?”, and 
second, “how the practice molds museology?”. 
Certainly, museology cannot be the science that 
studies the limited and undefined universe of the 
museum. The very concept of the ‘museum’ used 
to explain heterogeneous experiences, to which 
theorists refer as a “phenomenon” related to the 
terms “museology”, “museography”, “theory of 
museum”, “museistic” (Stránský 1980: 43-44), 
and so on…, is fragrantly an artifice of method, 
created as such to justify the existence of a sci-
entific museology.
Beyond this tautological conception, the prac-
tice that is available for actual research escapes 
any kind of ‘museum’ characterization. By con-
sidering the study of the mediations that formal-
ize the wide process of musealization - which 
may be mistaken for the process of declaring 
heritage, when we accept the viewpoint of a 
science called “heritology”7 (Šola 1992) - we 
have, then, a concrete empirical field for muse-
ology. It is clear, thus, that an effective science 
may conceive musealization as an agency and all 
the persons and objects involved in it as agents. 
To find the tracing of these associations would 
be the work of the museologist (who is not the 
museum professional but the scientist). As the 
epistemologist who think about “the meaning of 
meaning”, or the psychologist who think about 
how people think, the museologist can be seen as 
the one who think about the museology “think-
ing” - and in this sense, Stránský wouldn’t be 
wrong by suggesting the existence of “meta-the-
oretical problems” for this “science” (Stránský 
1980: 44). 
By focusing on the study of performances and 
associations, this area of studies becomes less 
detached to the ‘museum’ as an absolute object 
and more concerned with the museums’ repre-
sentations. The museum performance would 
work as a measurement or a standard represen-
tation to be studied in the different contexts in 
which it is evoked, from the Louvre to the fave-
2.2 From reflex to reflexivity: a new paradigm 
or the emergency of a study field?
The new paths for museology here appointed 
might generate, at first, a confusion of the com-
monly used categories and express chaos expos-
ing museology’s anti-structure. However, if we 
look closer, this unstable scenery may represent a 
new and better order for this field of knowledge. 
As most of the social sciences today, museology 
might be confronted to a new epistemic frame-
work in permanent transformation. 
Most of the recent transformations in the social 
sciences were due to a critical debate on its own 
methods. The methodologically palpable objects 
of science - which is how they were perceived - 
are introduced to a reflexive perspective, as the 
very creations of scientists. 
The invention of unilateral relations or real-
ities that can be “touched with a finger” (Bour-
dieu 1992: 228) has been for long common for 
social scientists who preferred to deal with these 
well-defined concepts instead of with the very 
conception of the concepts. In museology, the 
invention of philosophical truths has caused a 
series of misunderstandings among theorists. To 
this confusion, there could only be an empirical 
solution. 
After the beginning of the 1980s and the first 
superficial attempts to summarize a theory for 
museology, some authors (Van Mensch 1992; 
Teather 1983) pointed a more realistic solution 
for a scientific museology. Research was the an-
swer. The truth of the matter is that no philosoph-
ical magic would create a science or its subject 
without a considerable amount of empirical and 
theoretical research.
What substantially prevents the existence of a 
science called ‘museology’ today is still the fact 
that its theoretical production and its methods are 
marked by the Cartesian idea of the ‘museum’ de-
signed, as a metaphor and literally, in the ratio-
nalist system of knowledge fabricated in Western 
Modernity. In this ‘museum’ that organized ob-
jects and ideas - or ideas as objects - ‘things’ were 
created to be put in the shelves of knowledge in 
order to be observed, organized, counted, weight-
ed and measured by the encyclopedic scientist. 
Man was very much separated from things, and 
things were fully dominated as passive objects in 
the gnosiologic relation. 
Museology, born in the interior of museums 
of this kind, and conceived by the professionals 
working in these institutions, has inherited their 
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the concept is not realistic. From the gnosiologic 
paradigm, we depart towards a reflexive paradigm 
that suppose the reevaluation of the very tools 
that create our paradigms. 
As other human sciences, museology must be 
reassembled as a science of mediations in order to 
act on the transition between its own representa-
tions and the representations of the actors it stud-
ies, evolving from what has been so far a corpus 
of reflections on the museum to a reflexive mu-
seological discipline. 
las of Rio de Janeiro, that share a belief in this 
historically idealized categorization. 
If the study of museology is museology, thus, 
the classical rationalist pretension of the mu-
seum’s absolute objectivity must be left aside 
making space to a relative objectivity that consid-
ers the museum representation according to the 
agents’ agencies. Furthermore, it is mandatory to 
accept that the museum as a philosophical enti-
ty depends on the specific categories and institu-
tions from the West, and the universalization of 
noteS
1. Here in the singular form referring to the presumed unity of museology’s subject of study. 
2. Villy Toft Jensen summarized the result of a survey on museology undertaken among some European 
museum professionals during 1975 and presented it in the Museological Working Papers, in 1980.
3. Stránský would modify the concept of museality over the years, changing its sense from a value category 
to the specific value orientation itself, as noted by Van Mensch (Stránský 1974, 1980; Van Mensch 1992). 
This notion would be criticized by Klaus Schreiner (1987), a thinker from the German Democratic Republic, 
who wouldn’t conceive museality as the property of an object as such but as something that is attributed to 
the object only in the context of a particular, specialized discipline. According to Schreiner, there cannot be 
a value “in itself” and the concept of museality in the stranskyan sense is the product of a “bourgeois-impe-
rialist axiology”. He considers that the philosophical value propagated is “timeless, classness and generally 
not human” and that, as such, it “absolutise the bourgeois class interests” (Schreiner 1987 apud van Mensch 
1992). 
4. Created as an international committee of the International Council of Museums (ICOM) in 1977, by the 
initiative of Jan Jelínek, who was then the ICOM president. 
5. To whom the scientific character of museology was based on the phenomenological references and the 
gnosiological reference or a reference to the theory of knowledge that privileged the subject-object relation 
in the production of knowledge (Baraçal 2008: 46). 
6. Social dramas are, in Turner’s performance theory, social processes in which societies can understand 
themselves by having its structure exposed through a series of conflictive events or crisis. (Turner 1988). 
 7. “Heritology” is a term created by Tomislav Šola.
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